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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of
the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.

iii

Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer
of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each
House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the
United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
the United States nor any State shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-601 (1992) provides in pertinent part:
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item
capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury, or a facsimile or representation of the
item, and:
(a) the actor 1 s use or apparent use of
the item leads the victim to reasonably
believe the item is likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim
verbally or in any other manner that he is
in control of such an item.

iv

Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-203 (1992) provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated
burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing
from a burglary the actor or another participant
in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person
who is not a participant in the crime; or
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use
of a dangerous weapon against any person who
is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any
explosive or dangerous weapon.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-301 (1992) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional
taking of personal property in the possession of
another from his person, or immediate presence,
against his will, accomplished by means of force
or fear.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 (1992) provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if
in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601; or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellee/Respondent,

:

v.

:

PIERRE ADAMS,

:

Appellant/Petitioner.

:

Case No.
Case No. 910437-CA
Priority No. 13

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals fail to follow state and

federal law when it determined that the eyewitness identification
procedure used in this case did not violate the state or federal
constitution?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals incorrectly decide an

important question of statutory construction which should be decided
by this Court when it determined that there was sufficient evidence
to convict Petitioner of Aggravated Robbery even though the robber
did not use an item to threaten the clerks?

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Adams, 184
Utah Adv. Rep. 72 (Utah App. 1992) (Case No. 910437-CA, filed
April 9, 1992) is attached hereto as Appendix A.

JURISDICTION
On April 9, 1991, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion
in this case.

This Court granted Petitioner an extension of time in

which to file this Petition for Writ of Certiorari up to and
including June 8, 1992.
This Court has jurisdiction to review this petition
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2a-4 (1992).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Pierre Adams filed a pretrial motion to suppress
the identification testimony of two witnesses, claiming that the
showup identification procedure violated due process under the state
and federal constitutions.

R. 53-4. After a hearing and argument

held on October 23, 1990, prior to this Court's decision in State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the trial court denied the
motion.

R. 164.
After the State presented its case, Mr. Adams moved to

reduce the charge from aggravated robbery to simple robbery.
R. 163:207-8.

The trial court denied the motion.

R. 163:208.

Thereafter, a jury convicted Mr. Adams as charged.

R. 50.

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's rulings.

Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 72.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the afternoon of August 3, 1990, two clerks who were
working in a fast food establishment in Salt Lake City were robbed.
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R. 164:2; 163:7,8.

When the robber entered the store, one of the

clerks was pouring punch into the punch machine and the other clerk
was talking on the telephone.

R. 163:9,21; 164:3,7.

The clerk who was talking on the telephone in a room which
was adjacent to the counter continued talking throughout the
robbery.

R. 163:22,23; 164:7,66.

She did not realize that a

robbery had occurred until after it was over and the other clerk
told her that she had been robbed.

R. 163:23; 164:68.

The clerk at the counter asked the man if she could help
him.

When he indicated that he had already been helped, she

continued to pour punch.

R. 163:9; 164:4.

The man then asked the

clerk if she had any money, and she responded that she did not.
R. 163:10.

The man then indicated that he wanted all the money in

the store, and the clerk realized that she was being robbed.
R. 163:11; 164:4.

Immediately after the robbery, the clerk at the

counter was distraught and crying.
The man told the clerk at the counter to find out to whom
the other clerk was talking or he would shoot her.

R. 164:7-8.

The

clerk never saw a gun, but testified that the man touched his back
pocket and said he had a gun.

R. 164:8.

Petitioner did not have a

gun when he was arrested, and the officers searched the area and
were unable to find a gun.

R. 164:134,148.

The robber was a black man whom neither clerk had seen
before.

Neither clerk was black.

R. 163:9,17,; R. 164:4.

After the robber left, the two women discussed his
appearance and dress, and together they wrote down a description.
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R. 163:26.

Officers did not save this written description.

Ten to twenty minutes after the robbery and about a half
block away from the fast food restaurant, police arrested Mr. Adams
after chasing him and taking him to the ground.

They handcuffed him

and placed him in a paddywagon. R. 163:27,48.
Police transported the two clerks to the place where other
officers had arrested Mr. Adams.

R. 164:15.

The officers told the

clerks that they were holding someone nearby who they thought had
committed the robbery.

R. 164:46.

Seated together in the back of the police car, the two
clerks saw a disheveled and handcuffed black man being held up by
two officers either next to or inside the police "paddy wagon".
R. 164:75,47.

Several police cars and officers were at the scene.

R. 164:153,165.
One clerk testified that the clothing the individual wore
did not look like the clothing the robber wore.

R. 164:46. She had

testified at the preliminary hearing that she made the
identification based on the clothing that the robber wore.
R. 164:48.

The clerks' descriptions of the clothing did not match

the clothing worn by Mr. Adams when he was arrested.
The clerks testified that the robber's hair was either
short or long and curly but without braids. R.164:17,61-2,74,88.
Officer Evans testified that Mr. Adams' hair was braided when he was
arrested.

R. 164:102-3,117.

At a lineup, one clerk selected Mr. Adams but wrote his
number on the back of the card, which indicated that she was not
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sure.

R. 164:92-4,97. The other clerk was not quite sure at the

lineup.

R. 164:54,57-8.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE DID
NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS UNDER EITHER THE STATE OR
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION FAILS TO FOLLOW EXISTING LAW.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects
an accused against the use of suggestive and unreliable eyewitness
identification procedures.

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,

184 (1968); Stovall v. Denno. 388 U.S. 293, 303 (1967); Neil v.
Biggers. 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
In Biggers, the Court outlined five factors to be
considered in determining whether under the "totality of
circumstances" the eyewitness identification procedure violated due
process.

Those factors are:
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, [2] the
witness' degree of attention, [3] the accuracy of
the witness7 prior description of the criminal,
[4] the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the confrontation, and [5] the length
of time between the crime and the confrontation.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals set forth these

factors and acknowledged that
"The court must balance these five factors
against the 'corruptive effect' of the
identification procedures in order to determine
whether the identification testimony should have
been suppressed."
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Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 73 quoting Archuleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d
709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989)(quoting Mason v. Brathwaite. 432 U.S. 98f
114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253 (1977).
Although the Court of Appeals set forth the appropriate
factors, it did not apply them properly to the facts in this case;
nor did it take into account the "corruptive effect" of the
procedure utilized.

In addition, it inappropriately relied on a

much criticized and arguably discarded factor—the certainty of the
witnesses—in reaching its decision.

See Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep.

at 73-4; State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 780-2 (Utah 1991); State v.
Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986).
In this case, although both clerks arguably had an
opportunity to look at the robber, the testimony demonstrated that
neither clerk paid much attention to him.

The prior description was

compiled by both and therefore tainted each clerk's memory and was
not accurate.

The witnesses apparently were not certain at the

lineup, and any "certainty" they felt developed as they had repeated
opportunities to view Mr. Adams during the court proceedings.
Although not much time elapsed between the robbery and the
identification, the testimony revealed that the clerk who was at the
counter was distraught and crying after the incident.
In addition, the "corruptive effect" of the procedure
utilized in this case outweighed any reliabilty that may have been
demonstrated by the application of the Biggers factors.

The

procedure used in this case was unreliable and had a "corruptive
effect" because (1) the two clerks worked together to come up with a
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single description, thereby tainting each other's memory of the
robber, (2) the two clerks sat together in the police car and
together identified Mr. Adams as the robber, (3) no one other than
Mr. Adams was present who could have been the robber, (4) Mr. Adams
was held by police officers at or near the door of paddy wagon,
(5) officers told the clerks that they thought they had the robber,
and (6) Mr. Adams is black; neither of the clerks are the same race.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the eyewitness
identification procedure violated federal due process.
The eyewitness identification procedure also violated state
due process which is guaranteed by Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution.

In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-784, this Court

set forth a more stringent and updated analysis for determining
whether an eyewitness identification procedure violates due process
under the state constitution.
The factors to be considered in determining whether the
state constitution was violated are:
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree
of attention to the actor at the time of the
event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and mental
acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification
was made spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being
observed and the likelihood that the witness
would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly. This last area includes such factors
as whether the event was an ordinary one in the
mind of the observer during the time it was
observed, and whether the race of the actor was
the same as the observer's.
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Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781 quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493.
Rather than analyzing these factors as they apply to the
present case, the Court of Appeals focused on Ramirez and concluded
that "[t]he facts of the present case present a more trustworthy
procedure than did Ramirez." Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 74. The
only application of the facts in the present case was as follows.
[B]oth women had a good opportunity to view the
robber. Maestas,s attention, in particular, was
focused on him throughout the event. The record
indicates the women each remembered details of
the man's clothing and both appear to be quite
observant. The women's descriptions of the man
to the police after the robbery, at the motion to
suppress hearing and at trial are basically
consistent.
Id.
This simplistic analysis miscontrues the evidence and
disregards the fact that the clerks worked together in coming up
with a description and in identifying Mr. Adams at the paddy wagon.
This overwhelmingly prejudicial aspect of the identification
procedure in the present case appears not to have been present in
Ramirez.

Id. at 776.
The Court of Appeals failed to follow the dictates of

Ramirez when it determined that Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution was not violated in this case.
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court grant a
writ of certiorari on the issues of whether state or federal due
process was violated by the eyewitness identification procedure
utilized in this case.
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POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
DECIDED AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF STATE STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER
HAD COMMITTED AN AGGRAVATED ROBBERY EVEN THOUGH
NO ITEM WAS USED IN THREATENING THE CLERKS.
Neither clerk saw a gun or a facsimile thereof, and the
officers did not recover a gun when they arrested Mr. Adams.
R. 164:8,134,138.

One clerk testified that the robber put his hand

on a bulge in his back pocket and said "I don't want to have to
shoot."

R. 164:31,34. The robber also said that he would come back

and shoot the clerk if she were to call the police.
man never said that he had a gun.

R.164:38.

The

R. 164:35,38.

The issue presented in this case is whether the current
version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-302 affects this Court's holding in
State v. Suniville. 741 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1987), and State v.
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989).
In Suniville and Bruce, this Court held that an individual
must use a firearm or a facsimile thereof in order to be convicted
of an aggravated robbery.1

In Suniville, the teller testified that

the defendant had his coat up over the counter and that "something
was pointing at [her] in his pocket."

Suniville, 741 P.2d at 962.

The robber threatened to turn the incident into a homicide and to

1. The robberies in Suniville and Bruce involved threats to shoot.
The statute in effect at the time provides that:
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing a robbery, he:
(a) uses a firearm or facsimile of a
firearm, knife or facsimile of a knife or a
deadly weapon . . . .
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"blast" anyone who tried to follow him.

In Bruce, a man called and

claimed to have a gun pointed at the clerk, then the defendant
entered the store and pointed his pocket at the clerk.

In each

case, this Court held that there was insufficient evidence to
sustain a conviction for aggravated robbery.
In Suniville, this Court observed the "critical distinction
between robbery and aggravated robbery where the evidence is only of
verbal threats and intimidating gestures."

In so doing, it

prevented the "erosion" of distinction between the two crimes.
Suniville, 741 P.2d at 965.
The current version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 provides
in relevant part:
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601; or . . . .
Section 76-1-601 defines a dangerous weapon as:
. . . any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or
representation of the item, and:
(a) the actor 7 s use or apparent use of
the item leads the victim to reasonably
believe the item is likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim
verbally or in any other manner that he is
in control of such an item.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 which defines simple robbery has
not changed.
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Petitioner argued that § 76-1-601, when read together with
§ 76-6-302, required that a robber use an item and not merely
threaten to shoot in order to commit an aggravated robbery.
In reaching its decision that threatening to shoot was
sufficient to elevate the crime to aggravated robbery, the Court of
Appeals relied on this Court's decision in State v. Hartman, 783
P.2d 544 (Utah 1989).
In Hartman, this Court held that an individual is guilty of
an aggravated burglary where he verbally threatens the use of a
dangerous weapon during the course of a burglary.

Hartman is not

dispositive of the issue in this case for two reasons:

(1) the

language of the aggravated burglary statute is different than that
of the aggravated robbery statute, and (2) the distinction between a
simple burglary where no one is confronted or no verbal threat to
use a weapon is made is much greater than the distinction between a
simple robbery and an aggravated robbery after the decision in Adams.
All robberies involve direct contact between the victim and
the robber, and threats and fear. Not all burglaries involve direct
contact between the burglar and the dweller; those that do involve
direct contact do not always involve threat or fear.

While this

Court's decision in Hartman preserved a distinction between burglary
and aggravated burglary, the decision of the Court of Appeals eroded
the distinction between robbery and simple robbery.
Because this issue involves an important question of
statutory construction, Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this
Court grant a writ of certiorari on this issue.
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CONCLUSION
Petitioner Pierre Adams respectfully requests that this
Court grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the issues set
forth herein,

SUBMITTED this

fttL

day of June, 1992.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner

LYNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 3 32 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney
General's Office, 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

day of June, 1992.

JOAN C. WATT
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DELIVERED this

day of June, 1992.
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APPENDIX 1

72

McPherson v. Belnap

CODE• CO
Provo, Utah

184 Utah Adv Rep. 70

therefore, cannot be presumed negligent. He
further argues that even if the presumption
applies, the presumption was rebutted.
When the bailment is for the mutual benefit
of the bailor and the bailee, and the property
cannot be accounted for, "a presumption of
negligence is imposed on the bailee once the
bailor proves the fact of bailment and damage
to [or absence of] the bailed goods. The bailee
must then come forward with evidence that
the loss or damage was not due to the bailee's
negligence." Staheli v. Farmers' Coop., 655
P.2d 680, 682 (Utah 1982); accord Romney,
111 P.2d at 546. The reason for the presumption is the bailee, as the party in possession
of the property, "is in a better position to
control the conditions that may cause loss or
damage and to know, or at least to be able to
ascertain, the cause of any actual loss or
damage." Staheli, 655 P.2d at 683; accord
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah
44, 132 P.2d 680, 687 (1943). Therefore, for
the presumption to apply, the bailee must be
in exclusive possession of the property. Staheli,
655P.2dat683.
Vaughn Belnap argues his case is similar to
Staheli, where the Utah Supreme Court
refused to presume negligence because the
bailee was not in exclusive possession of the
property. See id. at 684. However, in Staheli,
the plaintiffs and others, including transients,
had unlimited access to the bailed property. Id.
at 682. Therefore, the bailee did not have
such control over the property so as to be in a
better position than plaintiffs to determine or
prevent the cause of the loss. Id. at 684. In the
instant case, McPhersons did not have access
to their property, nor were they in a position
to prevent or determine the cause of the theft.
We have already concluded that Vaughn
Belnap had the right and the power to control
McPhersons' property. He allowed Jeffrey
Belnap to use the property, as permitted by
the bailment agreement, but he remained responsible for its safety. A bailee cannot escape
the presumption of negligence by electing to
turn over the care of the property to another.
Therefore, we conclude the trial court properly
applied the negligence presumption to Vaughn
Belnap.
To rebut a presumption of negligence, a
defendant must present some evidence of due
care. Once a defendant presents evidence to
prove due care, the presumption of law disappears, but an inference of negligence remains
for the trier of fact to weigh along with the
defendant's evidence. Wyatt v. Baughman,
121 Utah 98, 239 P.2d 193, 195 (1951). The
only evidence Vaughn Belnap presented to
show due care was that there were normal
locks on the doors, and Jeffrey Belnap remembered locking the doors because of an incident with his wife. The trial court characterized Jeffrey Belnap's testimony as to locking
the doors as merely a self-serving statement.

McPhersons showed that the investigating
officer found no evidence of forcible entry,
suggesting the circumstances were suspicious.
After reviewing the evidence, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in finding Vaughn
Belnap negligent.
CONCLUSION
We conclude the trial court did not err in
finding: (1) McPhersons and Vaughn Belnap
entered a bailment agreement, (2) the bailment
was for the mutual benefit of the parties, and
(3) Vaughn Belnap was negligent in caring for
the goods. We, therefore, affirm.
Judith M. Billings Associate Presiding Judge
WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
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GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant Pierre Adams appeals his conviction of aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §766-302 (1990). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
At approximately 4:30 p.m. on August 3,
1990, a man approached the drive-up
window at the Taco Time restaurant on 1000
West and North Temple in Salt Lake City,
and ordered two tacos. He then told the clerk
he had changed his mind and would come in
the restaurant and order. Two young women,
Robyn Maestas and Jennifer Green well, were
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working at the restaurant at the time. Maestas conclusion are, however, entitled to a presuwas at the counter pouring punch when the mption of correctness. Id.
man walked in. Greenwell, who had helped
Defendant's motion to suppress the identihim at the drive-up window, was in the fication was based on both the Fourteenth
office talking to her father on the telephone. Amendment to the United States Constitution
The office is approximately five feet from the and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitcounter and the office door was open.
ution. However, at the hearing on the motion,
The man stood across the counter, about defense counsel did not make separate argutwelve inches from Maestas, and demanded all ments under each constitutional provision or
of the money in the store. Maestas opened the j differentiate between them.
cash registers and gave him the money. Still
Determining the constitutionality of an outon the telephone, Greenwell was unaware the of-court eyewitness identification procedure
store was being robbed. The man repeatedly under the Federal Constitution involves a twoasked Maestas to whom Greenwell was talking step analysis. Archuleta, 864 F.2d at 711.
on the telephone. He became upset and told First, the court must determine whether the
Maestas that if she did not find out, he would identification procedure was unnecessarily
shoot her. He also told her not to tell Green- suggestive so as to give rise to the possibility
well about the robbery or call the police or he of irreparable misidentification. Neil v.
would come back and shoot her. Maestas Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-200, 93 S. Ct.
never saw a gun but testified that the man 375, 381-82 (1972); Simmons v. United States,
touched a bulge in his pocket and said he had 390 U.S. 377, 383-84, 88 S. Ct. 967, 970a gun. He remained in the restaurant a total 71 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
of ten to fifteen minutes. When he left, he 302, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 1972 (1967).
walked slowly south on 1000 West. Maestas
Second, the court must determine "whether
and Greenwell immediately wrote down a under the totality of the circumstances, the
description of the robber and Greenwell called identification was reliable." Biggers, 409 U.S.
the police. The police officers did not save the at 199, 93 S. Ct. at 382; see also Mason v.
written description, however.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S. Ct. 2243,
Approximately ten to twenty minutes after 2253 (1977)(" reliability is the linchpin in detGreenwell called the police, police officers ermining the admissibility of identification
arrested defendant about a half block away testimony"). The Supreme Court set forth five
from the Taco Time. A police officer then factors to be considered when evaluating the
took Maestas and Greenwell to identify defe- reliability of an identification procedure:
ndant, whom they said fit the women's desc1. The opportunity of the witness to
ription of the robber. Defendant was handcview the criminal at the time of the
uffed and standing between two police officers
crime;
in the doorway of a police van. Both women
2. The witness's degree of attensat together in the back of the police car and
tion;
identified defendant from a distance of about
3. The accuracy of the witness's
thirty feet. Defendant was arrested and
prior description of the criminal;
charged with aggravated robbery. He did not
4. The level of certainty demonstrhave a gun when the officers arrested him.
ated by the witness at the confronBefore trial, defendant made a motion to
tation; and
suppress testimony regarding the eyewitness
5. The length of time between the
identification, claiming the procedure violated
crime and the confrontation.
his due process rights. The trial court denied
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S. Ct. at
the motion. Following a jury trial, defendant
382-83 (1972). "The court must balance these
was convicted of aggravated robbery.
five factors against the 'corruptive effect' of
the identification procedures in order to detISSUES
Defendant appeals his conviction on the ermine whether the identification testimony
basis that the witness identification process should have been suppressed." Archuleta, 864
was improper and that the aggravated robbery F.2d at 711 (quoting Mason, 432 U.S. at 114,
charge should have been reduced to simple 97 S. Ct. at 2253); United States v. Thurston,
771 F.2d 449, 453 (10th Cir. 1985).
robbery.
Applying the Biggers factors to the facts of
WITNESS IDENTIFICATION
this case, we find that the identification proThe constitutionality of an identification cedure was not unnecessarily suggestive. We
procedure is a mixed question of law and fact. also conclude that the procedure was reliable
Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 598, 102 S. under the totality of the circumstances. The
Ct. 1303, 1306 (1982). The trial court's con- identification occurred a short time after the
clusion that defendant's due process rights robbery took place. Both women had the
were not violated is reviewed de novo. Arch- opportunity to observe the robber. Greenwell
uleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. observed him when he approached the drive1989). The factual findings underlying the up window. Maestas observed him from a
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twelve inch distance for ten to fifteen minutes
while he was robbing the restaurant. Maestas
testified that she was looking "at him most of
the time." immediately after the robber left,
Greenwell and Maestas together wrote down a
description of him. At the suppression
hearing, Maestas testified that the man was
black and was wearing a navy blue or black
shirt that was open in the front and a baseball
cap. She testified that Adams "had the same
clothing on, and the same ball cap on, and
everything," when she first identified him for
the police. Both Greenwell's and Maestas's
testimony at the suppression hearing and at
trial indicate that they were certain Adams was
the robber. We conclude that the eyewitness
identification procedure did not violate defendant's due process rights under the Federal
Constitution.
This court has frequently stated we will not
analyze issues under the Utah Constitution
when the trial court did not have the opportunity to do so. "[T]he proper forum in which
to commence thoughtful and probing analysis
of state constitutional interpretation is before
the trial court, not ... for the first time on
appeal." State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273
(Utah A p p . 1990)(citation omitted).
"Nominally alluding to such different constitutional guarantees without any analysis
before the trial court does not sufficiently
raise the issue to permit consideration by this
court on appeal." State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d
326, 328 (Utah App. 1989) rev'd on other
grounds (citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d
799, 801 (Utah App. 1987)).
We note, however, that in Stare v. Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme
Court, applying the Utah Constitution, affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to
suppress an out-of-court eyewitness identification that was much less reliable than that
in the instant case. In Ramirez, the defendant
was convicted of aggravated robbery. The
incident occurred out of doors at about 1:00
a.m. Defendant was one of two robbers and
wore a mask which covered most of his face.
The eyewitness was one of the victims. He was
held at gun point and had only a few minutes
to observe defendant. When defendant arrived
with the police to identify him, defendant was
handcuffed to a chain link fence. He was the
only suspect present and was surrounded by
police officers. The eyewitness identified him
from the back seat of the police car. The
eyewitness was the only one of three victims
who was able to identify defendant. The
supreme court held that the eyewitness identification procedure did not violate defendant's
due process rights under either the Utah or
federal constitutions. Id. at 784.
The facts of the present case present a more
trustworthy procedure than did Ramirez. As
discussed above, both women had a good
opportunity to view the robber. Maestas's
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attention, in particular, was focused on him
throughout the event. The record indicates the
women each remembered details of the man's
clothing and both appear to be quite observant. The women's descriptions of the man to
the police after the robbery, at the motion to
suppress hearing and at trial are basically
consistent. We conclude that these facts constitute a reliable identification under the Utah
Constitution.
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE
Defendant argues the trial court erred in
failing to dismiss the aggravated robbery
charge. He claims that because he was not in
possession of a dangerous weapon during the
robbery, he could only be charged with and
convicted of simple robbery. The elements of
aggravated robbery are codified in Utah Code
Ann. section 76-6-302 (Supp. 1990) which
reads in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits aggravated
robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a
dangerous weapon....
Simple robbery is defined in Utah Code
Ann. section 76-6-301 (1990) as:
[T]he unlawful and intentional
taking of personal property in the
possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence,
against his will accomplished by
means of force or fear.
Defendant argues one must actually possess
an item which is a dangerous weapon in order
to be charged with and convicted of aggravated robbery.
"The appropriate standard of review for a
trial court's interpretation of statutory law is
correction of error." State v. James, 819 P.2d
781, 796 (Utah 1991); Stare v. Swapp, 808
P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App. 1991).
We find State v. Hartman, 783 P.2d 544
(Utah 1989), dispositive of this issue. In Hartman, the supreme court held that threatening to use a dangerous weapon while committing a burglary or an assault is sufficient to
fit within the aggravated burglary or aggravated assault statutes respectively. "Use or
display of such a weapon is not required;
threat of such use is sufficient." Id. at 547.
In enacting section 76-6-302, the legislature specified the crime of aggravated robbery
included robberies during which the robber
"uses or threatens to use a dangerous
w e a p o n . " Utah Code Ann. §76-6302(1 )(a). Threatening to use a dangerous
weapon during the commission of a robbery,
regardless of whether one actually possesses
such a weapon, is sufficient for a charge of
aggravated robbery under section 76-6-302.
Such a construction reflects the legislative
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intent in enacting the statute. See Hartman,
783 P.2d at 547.
In the instant case, defendant told Maestas
that he would shoot her if she told Greenwell
of the robbery, called the police, or if she did
not find out to whom Greenwell was speaking
on the phone. While he made these threats, he
put his hand on his bulging pocket, leading
Maestas to believe he had a gun and reasonably fear for her physical safety. It is not clear
whether defendant actually had a gun at the
time of the robbery, although he did not have
a gun when he was arrested. Because defendant threatened the use of deadly force, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in
failing to dismiss the aggravated robbery
charge.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the
eyewitness identification procedure did not
violate defendant's due process rights under
either the federal or Utah constitutions. We
also conclude that the trial court did not err in
failing to dismiss the aggravated robbery
charge. Defendant's conviction is affirmed.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
I CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
I CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
This is an appeal from a grant of summary
judgment in a probate proceeding. The trial
court held that appellee Phyllis Farrell
(Phyllis) is the surviving spouse of Russell
Farrell (Russell). Appellants, Russell's adult
children from a previous marriage, claim the
trial court erred. We affirm.
FACTS
Phyllis and Russell Farrell married April 22,
1978. No children were born of the marriage,
but both had children from previous marriages. In early 1989, Phyllis and Russell separated, and Phyllis filed a complaint for
divorce on or about April 7, 1989. Russell
signed a document entitled "Acceptance of
Service, Appearance, Consent and Waiver" on
April 8, 1989, stipulating to the entry of a
default divorce. Russell then moved to Alaska
and never returned to Utah.
The default divorce was set for hearing in
July 1989. Because Phyllis failed to appear,
the hearing was rescheduled for August 21,
1989. Russell died August 15, 1989 when the
fishing vessel upon which he was employed
capsized. Because neither Phyllis nor appellants had been notified of Russell's death by
August 21, 1989, the divorce hearing proceeded. After learning of Russell's death,
Phyllis moved to have the divorce decree
vacated nunc pro tunc. Her motion was
granted October 2, 1989.
Phyllis filed a "Petition for Determination
of Heirs" in the probate proceedings for
Russell's estate. By this petition, Phyllis
sought a court order declaring her to be
Russell's widow because she and Russell were
married at the time of his death. Appellants
objected to the petition, claiming Phyllis is not
Russell's surviving spouse due to the divorce
action. The trial court granted Phyllis's
motion for summary judgment, determining
that she is Russell's widow and an heir to his
estate.
On appeal, appellants contend the trial
court committed reversible error because,
p u r s u a n t to Utah Code A n n . §75-2803(2)(a) (1978), a provision of the Utah
Uniform Probate Code, Phyllis should not be
considered Russell's surviving spouse.
SURVIVING SPOUSE
Appellants claim Phyllis is not Russell's
surviving spouse because she filed a complaint
for divorce before his death and had a decree
of divorce entered after his death. The Utah
Supreme Court addressed the effect of a
party's death during a divorce proceeding in Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d 884 (Utah 1975). The
court held that "when the death of one of the
parties occurs after the entry of a divorce
decree and before the decree is final the decree
becomes ineffective." Id. at 885. In Nelson v.
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